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The pandemic strains supply chains. Lockdowns and border closures, quarantines
and bankruptcies slow down the global circulation of goods. And some goods never
arrive. Last summer, Sundhya Pahuja also ran into delivery problems. For a theme
issue of Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte, the German journal on the history of ideas,
dedicated to Kolonialwaren (colonial goods), the Australian international lawyer
had promised a piece, written jointly with Jeremy Baskin, about a particular colonial
commodity and its complex economic and cultural contexts.
Kolonialwaren have their firm place in the drawers of Germany’s memories. For
decades, the Kolonialwarenladen (colonial goods store) was part of the urban
landscapes of German cities, until it was displaced by supermarket chains in the
1970s. Exquisite and everyday goods, cocoa, tobacco, spices and sugar were
sold here, and later all kinds of other everyday commodities. A very German, but
also thoroughly global lieu de mémoire of the colonial that post-colonialism never
reached. A place to engage with materialities and political economies of the colonial,
continued in oppressive global inequalities now brought into even sharper relief in
times of the pandemic.
In Australia, the crisis of university system triggered by the pandemic also led to
fundamental restructurings at the University of Melbourne, where Pahuja teaches
international law. Last autumn, there was no time for quiet reflection on colonial
commodities and their intricate migration routes. But on a Tuesday in October, we
re-established the supply chain and spoke with Sundhya Pahuja about the situation
of academia on the other side of the world, about her research and her methods.
And, of course, about Kolonialwaren.
 
In the global academic market, scholarship has long been a commodity, and
if we think of the concept of the “neoliberal university”, the University of
Melbourne has been at the forefront of the economisation of research and
teaching in recent years. How has the pandemic affected everyday life and
institutional structures there?
The pandemic has led to a financial crisis of the Australian university system, caused
by dependence on students from overseas. In the last decade there has been a kind
of “unholy alliance” between conservatives and progressives: Universities were not
adequately funded by the public purse, and in addition to their function as a place
of education for Australians, an almost completely unregulated market for education
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was created, which was sold to international students. This went so far that in the
end almost half of the students were international students, who paid much higher
fees than locals in most courses of study. At the same time, there was a hyper-
casualisation of the academic workforce, a considerable increase in precarious
employment relationships, especially in teaching.  When the influx of money from
overseas dried up, almost all casual workers were laid off.
The doubly problematic situation of a marketised academic system with a high
number of casual workers, which in the pandemic collapsed, is a result of what
can be called the “neoliberalisation of the university”. We actually see here an
interesting example of transformations from colonial to postcolonial forms. One of
the narratives we cultivated involved nostalgia for what the philosopher Raimond
Gaita calls the “unworldly university” – a university that does not allow itself to
be pressured by the demands of the market, that opens up space for reflection,
that is oriented towards the humanities and that cultivates the liberal arts. This
nostalgic longing is particularly interesting against the background of the history of
Australian universities. They were founded when Australia was still a colony – to
educate professionals, with a strong vocational orientation. So there was a colonial
form of training technocrats to administer a colony, and this form was transformed
for a brief moment in the 1970s into something that held an inherent democratic
promise. When tuition fees were abolished in 1974 by a leftist government led by
Gough Whitlam, there was a brief moment of democratic enthusiasm, with many
people being the first in their family to attend university. Study remained free until
1988, when – interestingly – a Labour government introduced fees, but they were
quite moderate. The system was also designed as a model of deferred debt, with
repayment post-graduation based on income levels.
Thus, a transformation can be observed here: the migration of the colonial form
through what in some rich countries in the 1970s and 1980s increasingly proved
to be an atypical moment of democratic promise, up to the neoliberal forms of the
1990s and 2000s. During those decades, university governance was become more
corporatised, and efficiency was becoming the mantra, but in order to function, this
neoliberalising university depended on the idea of the “unworldly university” – and on
the fact that this idea was held up by most of its employees. Even as the functional
logics were increasingly determined by the market, we who worked there clung to
the idea of a university committed to the common good, detached from the world and
profoundly contemplative. It was this paradox, this myth, that ensured the functioning
of the university. Through their own work, the employees subsidised the university –
but when this work had to be monetised, the system could no longer be sustained.
 
But one could also say that this myth has become part of the Australian
university’s own marketing strategy – a marketable good. As a colonial
education system, the Australian academic system, as we have seen, was a
system in which the best people went from the periphery to the metropolis and
completed their graduate education, their doctoral studies in Great Britain,
and later also in the USA. In the past decade, this dynamic has been reversed
in some areas: in our field, for example, law, many of the best people from
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Europe and the US went to Melbourne, as visiting researchers or doctoral
students – because Melbourne promised this myth of the research-based, free
and intellectually stimulating university. So, the paradox has become part of
Australia’s success on the global academic market.
The sad irony of this – as far as our research profile is concerned – “golden age”
of Australian universities is a dirty secret, a dirty secret that we – I – should have
been much more aware of, even if it does not affect the law school as much as the
university as a whole: our research excellence was funded by overseas students
who paid six-figure sums for their degrees, through highly efficient marketing
structures and the exploitation of teachers in precarious employment.  While we
were swanning around and making a name for ourselves in international law, the
money for this was generated by rather problematic processes. That created a
surreal stratification even in the academic sector between those who are fancy
professors and those who are casual teachers.
 
Will this change now?
There are many in the University who want to return things to the way they were as
quickly as possible: open borders for international students, a funding model that is
essentially the same as it was before.  Government funding is hardly to be expected,
and the university system does not matter to most voters. When, at the beginning
of the pandemic, wage subsidies were offered to all businesses in the country at a
very generous level, universities were explicitly excluded. They could not access a
single cent; more money was earmarked for casinos than universities. For now, it is
hard to see without the reconceptualisation of a smaller university, what will happen
to research in Australia in the future.
 
Melbourne is part of the Pacific region, with most of the overseas students so
far coming from China and India. Looking at the geopolitical dynamics – can
we expect a considerable influx of students from these countries again once
the pandemic is over or at least becomes more manageable?
The vast majority of our overseas students are coming from China. That’s not
necessarily the case for every university in Australia, but certainly at Melbourne, and
so there was always the possibility that there would be a “geopolitical interruption”
to the flow of students.  And many people say that the strong dependence on China
has created a chilling effect, which limits research and open discussion. This is
why we are now urging our university management to think anew and differently
about the composition of our student body; to see it not just as a source of money
or monetary resources, but to consider what kind of mix of local and international




Is this perhaps even a kind of re-positioning of the university, by which the
university system is more strongly tied back to local communities?
Yes, absolutely. After all, the economic situation resulting from the pandemic, and
which will continue to do so, has already led to a massive increase in applications
from local students. For the University of Melbourne, which is at the top of the
hierarchy, this means a number of applicants that far exceeds our places. At the
same time, the government is demanding that students pay a greater share of the
cost of education, and the pressure on them is growing.  It is very difficult to predict
what will happen to our universities in the future, even the most elite ones.
 
Let’s think a little more about the impact of the pandemic, on a global scale. In
your podcast you recently had a very interesting discussion on this topic with
the two international law experts Michael Fahkri and Luis Eslava, with special
emphasis on Fahkri’s role as UN Special Rapporteur on Food Security. If we
look at the global impact of the pandemic, according to one conclusion of the
discussion, it becomes clear that many long-standing inequalities have taken
on sharper contours in recent months.
Yes, that’s right.  That observation has been made by many people by now. What
is interesting is: In a rich country like Australia, it seemed for a moment that there
might be a possibility of a reconfiguration of some of the neoliberal beliefs that
shape our politics. Unemployment benefits were increased, social benefits were
supplemented. Suddenly all the discussion about which poor people deserved
support and which did not – because everyone was affected by the pandemic –
disappeared. Nevertheless, social inequality has worsened. When we think about
basic social infrastructure in a global perspective, it becomes clear that countries
with good public health systems have so far coped much better. Places with more
equality have also achieved much better results. Some of my students in the Law
& Development course come from the Indian province of Kerala, and they have
written papers on the response to the pandemic in Kerala – it was very interesting
because they managed to keep infection rates and deaths really low there, at least
initially, by means of a very decentralised, so to speak “barefoot” health system.
Equality seems to have played a major role in this. The degree of existing equality
or inequality seems to be a real indicator of how countries are emerging from the
pandemic.  How the pandemic exposes inequality is shocking. When I teach online,
of course I see the big difference between those who have a room where they can
work well and those who work from their bedroom with a poor internet connection.
Many students from overseas are lonely, they don’t have jobs anymore because
the hospitality industry has disappeared, where many of them were employed. So
although on one level it is banal to describe life in the lockdown, in the pandemic, it
reveals an enlightening microcosm of the global political economy in which so many
things are so unevenly distributed.
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Let’s talk about the Kolonialware, the colonial commodity, which you originally
wanted to write about at this point.
With the article on the history of soap that Jeremy Baskin and I wanted to write for
you, we wanted to take up the fixation on hygiene in the pandemic – and think about
what the history of soap can tell us about the history, competition and convergence
between corporations and the state in the colonial era. How corporations became
a kind of link between metropolis and colony, how the state and corporations were
as much connected, through mass consumption and raw material extraction, with
the “civilising mission” as the point of convergence.  Just as this “civilising mission”
justified colonisation, it also provided an opportunity for the expansion of consumer
goods markets.
The advertising for Pears’ soap is really interesting because it works, for example,
with highly racist images of the arrival of bars of soap on tropical beaches. There
is this very famous advertisement for Pears’ Soap (now a Unilever product), which
shows a man in military uniform washing his hands, and under the picture is written
“the first step to lighten the white man’s burden”.  Often in illustrations you only see
this central part of the poster, but if you look at the whole ad, in the four corners
around the circle you see a warship, a merchant ship, a missionary and then a ship
carrying Pears’ Soap.  So we see the unity of military, trade, business and mission,
all under the banner of the civilising mission that underpinned the commercial
expansion.  We chose the example of soap also because it combines the extraction
of palm oil with the production of consumer goods markets in the North. In Victorian
England, the rich were afraid of the newly-urbanised poor because they were dirty
and potentially infectious. And they were also anxious to prevent the poor from being
“infected” by dangerous political ideas. Thus the civilising mission at home in the
metropolis was driven by the interpolation (interposition) of the working class-who
were thus “exported” with their needs to the colonies, as it were, to justify mass
extraction and the acquisition of markets.  Similar patterns can be found in the
French and German colonial projects of that period.
It is also interesting to see what work racist soap advertising did. The “savage”
depicted in the Pears’ ads offered the British working class the opportunity to
distinguish themselves from someone who seemed even more “other”. Thus,
alongside the justification of colonial expansion, there was also an import of colonial
racialisation into the heart of the Empire. There is a strong parallel here with the
history of modernisation and its continuities in the development project of the 20th
and 21st centuries. The congruence between the interests of the economy and those
of the imperial state is very succinctly found in Frederick Lugard’s The Dual Mandate
in British Tropical Africa (1922), when it speaks of civilisation and commerce.
Economy and state went hand in hand. And the historical examples show that the




The concentration on one object corresponds to a turn to materiality, which
can be observed in many areas of legal scholarship now. Is this a methodical
tool that you use more often?
In my own research I usually don’t do this; I am an institutional thinker, interested in
practices and institutions.  But I often teach using a single commodity – in my course
Investment, Regulation and Development I ask students to organise their thinking
around the history of a single commodity – be it coffee, bananas, sugar, oil or water.
  This has proven to be an immensely effective educational strategy. In research, a
material object can be a point of entry, a point of organisation which allows students
to find a larger story. One could tell a world history with a plastic spoon. Because
there was a moment when it seemed more logical, more economical to drill for oil
and make a plastic spoon, to use it once and then throw it away, rather than to have
someone wash a spoon, says something about the history of the 20th century. The
orientation towards objects or – as with Sheila Jasanoff and others in Science and
Technology Studies (STS) – towards a phenomenon or a group of people makes
it possible to think about ideas, institutions and material forms and structures as a
whole, to look at the ideal and the material at the same time.
 
Let’s talk a little more about institutions and institutional structures. You have
long been interested in the colonial, postcolonial and decolonial imprints
of states and international organisations – and the role that the concept of
“development” plays in them.
In my work I have described the history of the concept of development as a central
narrative of the transition from the colonial to the postcolonial era. The concept of
development arises from the “civilising mission”, and in some ways it is this concept
of development that prevented decolonisation from undermining the Euro-American
world’s claim to universality. It invited states to join an already existing project with a
vocabulary of self-transformation that gave people the illusion of self-determination
– but in reality prevented political decolonisation from becoming economic self-
determination. Development paved the way for the transformation from liberal to
neoliberal economic forms to prevail in the Global South. When people today speak
of the neoliberal state in the Global North and of the things that are imposed on
the people there, they are often talking about things that the people in the Global
South have long since been expected to do through interventions by the international
financial institutions, also in the name of “development”. So, the South is still an
experimental laboratory. It is here that ideas and concepts are tested to see which
ones work, and from here they migrate back to the North.
 
What exactly do you have in mind? The European austerity politics of recent
years? 
Let us recall what happened after the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. The
fragile political formations, which had been held together in a kind of grand bargain
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between centralised forms of authority and very disparate population groups by
instruments of public welfare (health care, education, cheap food), came under
pressure from rigid austerity measures and conditionality requirements. The states
were required to privatise, liberalise capital movements and abolish subsidies.  The
global financial crisis also brought these instruments back to Europe – neoliberal
orthodoxies that had been developed in the South in the 1980s and early 1990s.
 
And, of course, the law played a central role in shaping these situations,
and thus in redefining the state in relation to economic actors. How does a
closer look at institutions and practices transform our image of the state, our
understanding of law?
In my project Invisible Leviathans, I try to describe the relationship between
corporations, states and international law in a long historical perspective. The
metaphor of the Invisible Leviathan is intended to shed light on how the seemingly
national units of individual corporations come together to form a kind of global form
of the global corporation.  In place of small people who are integrated into the body
of the sovereign individual (in the image on the cover of Hobbes’ book), national
corporations will be united here in the organisational form of a global corporation
– through international law. So what I want to trace historically is the way in which
international law and its predecessors made this merger and the “migration” of
corporations and states to the South possible. Normally we hear a story about
the delegation of state authority to companies, and truisms like “trade follows the
flag” – but in my argumentation it is exactly the opposite: the flag followed trade,
and corporations were more like the “organic entities” Otto von Gierke described
than the “fictitious entities” Friedrich Carl von Savigny described. I am trying to
trace the nature of corporate forms and describe how in the 16th century the
use of these forms of enterprise in overseas trade turned profit-making into the
purpose of corporate forms. This is, historically and theoretically, an attempt to
tell a long story not only about the conceptualisation of the corporation, but also
about what corporations were and could do – from their beginnings, which probably
preceded those of the state. The combination of law and the state in the early British
positivists gave rise to the fiction of the corporation as a creature of the state – an
idea that never corresponded to reality. It makes the real public authority exercised
by corporations invisible. We attribute their power to an exogenous economic
phenomenon, but we forget that a fictitious person without a legal norm in the
background can neither have power nor exercise power.
 
Does such a pluralistic approach also change the concept of the state?
When I examine the transformations of the concept of corporation, I also try to follow
the transformations of what is understood as international law. So I come from the
ius gentium, the classic law of nations, which in my view was a more pluralistic law of
encounter, to the idea of international law, as Jeremy Bentham calls interstate law in
1840 – and thus establishes a fixation on the state as the sole actor in international
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law that had not existed before. I am thus trying to regain an idea, a concept of
international law as law of encounter, which makes rival forms of association visible
again, which encounter each other in the forms that this law makes possible and
promotes.
 
In such colonial (and post-colonial) encounters, is the state ultimately also a
kind of colonial commodity, a Kolonialware, with all the blurriness that this
term implies?
There is an irony in this word. When I was originally invited to contribute to this
theme, you translated the term Kolonialware as “colonial good” and then explained
the different nuances of the German word. This alerted me that “Goods” in English
means both commodities and goods, i.e. things that are good, and that both
meanings coincide in the word Kolonialware. I also looked up the etymology of
“good”: the origins of the word are very uncertain, and there is also a connection
via the Indo-European roots to the word gadh – which means “to make booty”
in Sanskrit. The Kolonialwareas colonial commodity thus carries both virtue and
marketability in itself, indeed it is virtue and commodity. When one speaks of the
legal form of the state, then it is actually very appropriate to call it a Kolonialware.
The double meaning helps us to understand a form that is both a commodity and a
place where the colonial subject strives to achieve virtue.
 
Sundhya Pahuja is Professor of International Law at the Melbourne Law School,
and Director of the Institute for International Law and the Humanities (IILAH) at the
University of Melbourne.
 
A translation into German has been published in Ulrike Gleixner, Alexandra
Kemmerer, Michael Matthiesen, Hermann Parzinger (eds), Kolonialwaren. Zeitschrift
für Ideengeschichte XV/1 (Spring 2021), CH Beck, München 2021 (128 p., 16 €).
- 8 -
